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Reconfiguring rights in austerity Britain: boundaries, behaviours and contestable margins 
Abstract  
This paper addresses policy change in Britain since 2010 across the three fields of domestic welfare, 
migration and asylum, and analyses the association between welfare, conditionality and control 
through the lens of civic stratification. Drawing on the work of Richard Munch and Mary Douglas, it 
moves beyond existing literature in this area to show that the more complex the classification in play, 
and the more severe its boundary implications, the more likely the emergence of contestable margins. 
Informed by Munch’s ‘battlefield’ approach, it provides a discussion of contestable margins in each of 
the three policy fields and outlines the nature and source of challenges that emerge within the 
‘institutional battlefield’. A concluding section reflects on what is revealed by viewing welfare, 
migration and asylum within the same conceptual frame, identifying an emergent welfare paradigm 
that displays recurrent problems across all three fields.  
Key words: welfare, migration, asylum, civic stratification, conditionality, contestation 
Introduction 
Prior to the 2010 General Election, David Cameron (2009) (then leader of the Conservative party) 
announced a coming ‘age of austerity’, whose central plank was an ambitious programme of welfare 
reform, framed as a moral mission of change and underpinned by a contestable notion of ‘fairness’ for 
the hardworking taxpayer (Cameron, 2012). Within this configuration, dependency was to give way to 
responsibility, enforced by frozen benefit rates and a heightened system of conditionality and 
sanctions (DWP, 2010), set to extend beyond provision for the workless to encompass support for the 
low paid within an integrated system of Universal Credit (UC) (DWP, 2010a)1. This reform of the 
welfare system also featured in political rhetoric as both the reason and means to control migration, 
with domestic welfare and migration presented as ‘two sides of the same coin’, and subject to an 
attack on the ‘something for nothing culture’ for all groups (Cameron, 2013). Welfare provision is 
particularly amenable to boundaries of inclusion and exclusion, engaging as it does questions of 
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resource, desert and belonging, and the design and delivery of the whole system increasingly rests 
upon techniques of conditionality and control that extend across the three fields of domestic welfare, 
migration and asylum. It therefore invites an approach that examines such policies together by means 
of a unified frame of analysis. 
Scholars recognise scope for a link between domestic welfare and the management of migration 
(Bommes and Geddes, 2000; Duevell and Jordan, 2002; Sainsbury, 2012), but have not so far 
produced a fully integrated analysis of this kind. An earlier article in this journal (Morris, 2007) 
argues that such a linkage can profitably engage Lockwood’s (1996) concept of civic stratification – a 
system of inequality rooted in the differential granting or denial of rights by the state. Welfare 
provision has a central role in Lockwood’s model as both constructing unequal treatment through the 
formal distinctions in play, and legitimising unequal treatment through related judgements of desert, 
and Morris (2007) extends the concept to address not only domestic welfare, but also migration and 
asylum. More recently, Shutes (JSP, 2016) offered a further refinement – though not explicitly 
engaging civic stratification, she shows how categories of inclusion and exclusion, circumstances of 
eligibility, and requirements of conduct differentially affect entitlement for various groups of both 
citizens and migrants.  
The present paper goes further, to show that the more complex the classificatory system, and the more 
severe its boundary implications, the greater its potential to generate contestable margins. This 
argument contributes to existing literature by directing attention to the boundary drawing at play in 
the stratified system of entitlement, its underpinning rationale, and the formal contestation this has 
provoked. However, before outlining the sections to follow and embarking on analysis we should look 
to two additional theorists, whose work can complement and amplify a civic stratification approach. 
Battlefields of change 
Changes apparent in austerity Britain offer a distinctive instance of what Munch (2012) terms the 
‘liberal competition state’, a model of inclusion based on the ‘cult of the individual’ and entailing a 
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shift ‘from collective national welfare to individualised trans-national and national inclusion’ (p1). 
Within this model, Munch points to the extension of opportunity beyond the nation, and a potential 
break-down of ‘insider/outsider morality’, noting that such trans-national economic integration is 
closely associated with the rise of global society under the auspices of human rights, and related 
requirements of responsible statehood. However, Munch also recognises that formalised rights of 
freedom and equality are prioritised over substantive social rights, such that the opening of society 
and economy to the outside generates fiercer competition for scarce goods on the inside (Munch, 
2012:4). To capture the unfolding welfare dynamic, he identifies four ‘battlefields’ that combine in 
the production of change - the economic, symbolic (rhetorical), solidaristic, and institutional; 
battlefields that interact in a process fraught with contestation that can lead to varied outcomes and 
hence requires empirical investigation.  
An important feature of Munch’s model is that political rhetoric can shape the way problems are 
perceived and tackled, and thus becomes manifest in the nature and shape of institutional change. This 
argument echoes the concerns of Mary Douglas (1986), who some thirty years ago addressed the 
question of how institutions think, identifying institutionalised systems of classification as central to 
this function. So institutions think, or better stated carry meaning, through the distinctions that 
underpin their administrative procedures, shaping the contours of society and potentially also popular 
conceptions of social divisions in the process. One instance of this complex can be found in the 
central role assumed by welfare systems in the management of global economic change, both through 
enhanced ‘activation’ of citizens and selective entry and entitlement for migrants (Duevell and Jordan, 
2002; Shutes, 2016).  
Recognition of the control dimension of social rights is by no means new (see Dwyer, 2014; Bommes 
and Geddes, 2000; Sainsbury, 2012, Shutes, 2016), but Munch’s framework draws attention to the 
way political rhetoric is translated into the details of policy and practice, and thus contributes to our 
understanding of the nature and process of welfare state change. Douglas sees such translation as 
raising epistemological issues concerning both the generation of a social system of knowledge, and 
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the hold that institutions have on processes of classification and recognition. Each of these insights 
has implications for the understanding and analysis of a system of civic stratification, respectively 
pointing to its supporting political rhetoric, and its role in shaping differential positions of entitlement 
and desert through a related process of boundary drawing. 
According to Douglas, social judgements come ready prepared by our own institutions and require 
detailed scrutiny of the categories or labels they produce to stabilise the flux of social life. In this 
process, she argues, institutions create the very distinctions (or boundaries) to which they apply, based 
on some naturalising principle that can ‘confer the spark of legitimacy’ (p48). In Munch’s model this 
is achieved when rhetoric establishes a coherent and closed system across several fields, and hence 
what he terms a distinctive ‘paradigm’, but will also require a degree of ‘fit’ within a broader 
institutional matrix that stretches beyond the national level. In a period of radical change such 
compatibility is by no means guaranteed, and attention must therefore turn both to how far publicly 
circulated moral meanings offer a basis for generating and justifying the social classifications shaping 
civic stratification, and also to the contestations they generate within their institutional setting; hence 
the ‘institutional battlefield’ of Munch’s model.  
The focus of this paper is therefore Munch’s fourth ‘battlefield’ of change, the institutional, as 
manifest in Britain’s reconfigured system of social rights, and the formal contestation it has provoked. 
The ‘institutional’ context here refers both to welfare provision itself2 – as it extends across the fields 
of domestic entitlement, migration and asylum, and to official avenues of formal contestation, 
variously including parliamentary review, policy consultation, and judicial scrutiny. The present paper 
is divided into three main sections that respectively consider key developments in the fields of 
domestic welfare, migration and asylum. Applying the theoretical framework set out above to each 
measure, it identifies: the emergent pattern of stratified rights; its justificatory rationale; the 
boundaries at issue; and the contentious nature of the distinctions in play. It outlines the nature and 
source of challenges that emerge within the ‘institutional battlefield’ and provides a summary 
discussion of contestable margins for each of the three policy fields. A concluding section looks 
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across the issues raised, to reflect on what is revealed by viewing welfare, migration and asylum 
within the same conceptual frame. In each field we find a justificatory rhetoric of ‘fairness’, an attack 
on welfare dependency, and related assumptions of abuse, all deployed in an elaborate exercise of 
boundary drawing geared to the erosion of social rights, and the construction of an emergent welfare 
paradigm that displays recurrent problems across all three fields. 
Reconfiguring domestic welfare – boundaries and behaviours  
From 2010 to 2016 a rhetoric of ‘fairness’ for the hard-working taxpayer has reconfigured 
conceptions of solidarity and refashioned the function and design of the welfare system. The 
underpinning rationale is captured by the statement: ‘if you refuse to work we will not let you live off 
the hard work of others’ (Cameron, 2010), and the claim that a robust set of sanctions will end the 
‘something for nothing culture’ (Duncan-Smith, 2013). In Douglas’s terms, the supporting 
epistemology sees dependency as a behavioural choice rooted in a cultural predisposition, and 
amenable to individualised, disciplinary correction (Adler, 2016). The boundaries generated are part 
of an intensified system of civic stratification built around the compulsion to work, imposed by 
heightened degrees of conditionality, and enforced by cuts and financial sanctions. Informed by 
Munch’s approach, we see a connecting chain that runs from rhetoric through solidarity to policy and 
programme design, to shape a stratified structure of desert that casts its net ever wider, generating 
boundary problems and contestable margins that then feature in the institutional battlefield.  
Out of work and in-work conditionality, 
In Lockwood’s (1996:539) model welfare dependency constructs a group ‘lacking in civic virtue’, 
which itself is stratified by differing degrees of desert, but the enhanced scope and severity of 
conditions and sanctions together amount to a further elaboration. The highest level of conditionality 
by conduct targets the unemployed claiming Job-seekers Allowance (JSA), requiring proof of work-
seeking before registration, and enforced by a ‘claimant commitment’ that intensifies job-search 
requirements. Fearful claimants already commit to conditions they know they cannot fulfil, but 
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requirements are set to rise under UC to 35 hours job-search a week (Work and Pensions Committee, 
2015:26). The boundaries at issue are manifest through financial sanctions for failure to comply, and 
the intensified regime introduced by the 2012 Welfare Reform Act operates at three levels of severity, 
depending on type and frequency of offence3, with sanctions lasting from a minimum of four weeks to 
a maximum of three years (against a prior range of one to 26 weeks). A further sub-stratum has to 
date operated via the Work Programme, described by Webster (2016) as a sanctions generating 
machine.4  
The boundary drawing entailed within this stratified system has been exposed to formal scrutiny, and 
the most troubling finding (Oakley, 2014) for a scheme seeking behavioural change has been the high 
proportion of sanctioned claimants with mental health problems, a learning disability, or lacking any 
clear understanding of why a sanction was applied. Within the institutional battlefield, official reviews 
(National Audit Office, 2016; Public Accounts Committee, 2017; Work and Pensions Committee, 
2015; Joint Committee on Human Rights, 2011) variously note a lack of evidence to show that 
sanctions work, the need for a clearer distinction between active abuse and significant effort, and the 
scope for as many as eight different categories among those affected - highlighting the problematic 
nature of the boundaries at issue. They also express concern about inconsistent and poor quality 
decision making, and the impact of sanctions on debt, rent arrears, homelessness, and destitution. 
Reviews criticise the paucity of formal monitoring of outcomes (Work and Pensions Committee, 
2015:22), highlight the inadequacy of official data (NAO, 2016), and cite evidence that some are 
driven out of the system without work (Loopstra et al, 2015), such that the justifying rationale begins 
to crumble.  
Nevertheless, a new stratum of civic stratification is to be established under UC as sanctions are 
trialled for extension via the construal of low wage supplements as a form of ‘entrenched dependency’ 
(DWP, 2010), pulling low-paid workers into conditionality. The boundaries of desert are thus redrawn 
and in Douglas’s terms, this epistemological shift reveals an ambiguity in the early promise to make 
work pay (DWP, 2010; 2010a), as supplements to the wage are eroded.5 The threshold for freedom 
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from conditionality and intensive work search requirements is set at 35 hours per week at the national 
minimum wage,6 and the underlying rationale implies abuse in addressing a ‘perverse incentive’ for 
claimants to restrict their hours and pay.7  
Together with frozen rates, cuts to in-work benefit via a reduced income threshold, an increased 
withdrawal rate against earnings, and reductions in the disregarded ‘work allowance’ mean an average 
yearly loss of £960 for families with children, and £2380 for single parents.8 These cuts met 
opposition in the House of Lords, where they were described as ‘morally indefensible’9, and a caution 
from the Work and Pensions Committee (2015) that they contradict the objective of making work pay. 
Effectively shrinking the category of desert, they were averted for Tax Credits (TCs) but with minor 
adjustment remain in place for UC, and though restoring the cuts would in theory increase incentives 
to work, conditionality and sanctions are now set to perform this function. Hence, the shifting 
meaning of ‘make work pay’ comes to rest on individual accountability and heightened conditionality 
enforceable by sanctions, rather than social responsibility or employer obligation. Against this 
rationale, the Work and Pensions Committee (2016) cites evidence that the problem is structural not 
motivational, while several organisations find a disproportionate effect on the disabled, and on 
families with children.10  
Distinctions of desert also extend to family size, such that assumptions of behavioural choice and a 
rhetoric of ‘fairness’ underpin the restriction of Child Tax Credits (CTCs) to two children per family. 
Paid both to low-paid and workless families, CTC is now limited to ensure that recipients ‘face the 
same financial choices about having children as those supporting themselves solely through work’ 
(Summer Budget 2015 HC 264 105-16, paras1.145). The limit has been criticised (Kennedy et al, 
2017) as punishing children for the situation of a parent, and complex exemptions have been 
necessary for non-consensual births, multiple births, and children adopted from care. The restriction 
on exemptions for kinship care has been ruled unlawful, but a broader challenge to the overall policy 
was dismissed (SC and Ors v SSWP [2018] EWHC 864 (Admin)). 
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In sum, domestic welfare operates through conditionality aimed at incentivising work, and rests on 
behavioural and motivational assumptions, while deploying cuts, conditions and sanctions as a 
disciplinary device that extends the scope of civic stratification. This has generated boundary 
problems concerning the attribution of personal responsibility, the erosion of guaranteed minimums, a 
disproportionate impact on the vulnerable, and negative effects for children. Despite related concern 
raised by institutional scrutiny, the UC system operates a more far-reaching conditionality and 
sanctions regime (Webster, 2017), redrawing the boundaries of desert while supplying compliant 
labour for a ‘flexible’ labour market (Dean, 2012). 
Capability and Caring 
Stratified conditions of entitlement have also focused on the Employment Support Allowance (ESA) 
for the long-term sick and disabled, based on a pre-existing distinction between the Support Group, 
which is free from conditions, and the Work Related Activity Group (WRAG) with limited capability 
for work. Placed at a lower level of conditionality than the unemployed, the latter are not compelled to 
seek employment but are subject to work readiness requirements with sanctions for non-compliance, 
though the classification rests on a controversial Work Capability Assessment (WCA).11 In 2012 
sanctions for the WRAG were increased from 50 to 100 per cent of the basic allowance from 
inception12 (Kennedy et al, 2016), and in 2017 a £30 supplement was removed from WRAG 
claimants. Intensifying the impact of a sanction, this reduction claims to address ‘the financial 
incentive that could otherwise discourage claimants from taking steps back to work’, described by one 
MP as an ‘ill-founded fantasy’ (Murphy and Keen, 2016).  
Problematic boundaries and institutional contestation are again in evidence. The WRAG cut was 
resisted in the House of Lords (Murphy and Keen, 2016) on the grounds that there is no evidence of a 
disincentive to work effect, that it would impede efforts to find work, and also have perverse health 
effects. The rebellion was averted by attaching a ‘financial privilege’ to the bill, but the crude 
boundary on which the cut is based has been questioned (Murphy and Keen, 2016; Griffiths and 
Patterson, 2014), with the WCA discredited for poor decision making, a high success rate on appeal13, 
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and rising costs14. The classifying process has itself been challenged, and the Court of Appeal (MM 
and DM v SSHD [2013] EWCA Civ 1565) found under the 2010 Equality Act that assessments have 
unlawfully discriminated against people with mental health problems, while the Upper Tribunal (CJ 
and SG v SSWP [2017] UKUT 0324) ruled that a one-month time limit on the right to appeal was 
unlawful, particularly affecting claimants with mental health or learning disabilities.  
Single parents are a further group traditionally subject to lighter conditionality, but exposed to a 
shifting boundary that can now require work-seeking when the youngest child is aged 3 (reduced from 
5 in 2016), thus shrinking the category of carer (Dwyer, 2014). This shrinkage limits the scope for 
challenge to the ‘benefit cap’ – itself a stratifying device introduced in 2013 to set a limit on the total 
benefit a household can receive15, again claiming to restore ‘fairness’ to the taxpayer16 and justified as 
improving work incentives17. There are exemptions for claimants in receipt of TCs (or 16 hours work 
under UC), or disability related benefits, but not for the WRAG, and though intended to incentivise 
employment, the cap encompasses single parents who are not required to work. The carer/worker 
distinction also proved problematic for the non-exemption of households with full time carers, now 
the subject of a successful challenge.  
The boundaries at issue for single parents were challenged in a Supreme Court intervention (SG and 
Ors v SSWP [2015] UKSC 16) by Child Poverty Action Group (CPAG): the comparator for claims to 
‘fairness’ is the income of families on an average wage, discounting benefits that are included in the 
cap (Child Benefit (CB), CTC, and Housing Benefit (HB)); the cap detracts from payments made to 
parents on behalf of the child; and in the name of a work incentive is applied to single parents not 
required to seek employment. The challenge failed because it turned on discrimination against these 
parents, though judges expressed concern about non-compliance with the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child (CRC). However, a later case (DA and Ors v SSWP [2017] EWHC 1446) - after a lowering 
of the cap broke the link with average earnings - succeeded on discrimination regarding the right to 
family and private life under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), thus drawing 
children into its ambit. Since the claimants were single parents with a child under two the judge 
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remarked (para 43, 30) that these were not the sort of households the cap was meant to cover, and nor 
were they single parents by choice. The rationale of the policy is further undermined by the fact that 
only 16 per cent of those affected must be actively seeking work.18 An earlier challenge to the cap 
(Hurley, Jarett and Palmer v SSWP [2015] EWHC 3382) succeeded with a claim of discrimination 
against disabled people under the ECHR19 through the failure to exempt households with full-time 
carers in receipt of Carers Allowance. The judge found the term ‘workless’ as applied to such 
households to be offensive (para 28). 
Thus, while the disabled and single parents occupy a position of lower conditionality within the 
system of civic stratification, this protection has been eroded by enhanced conditions of conduct for 
the WRAG and by the lowered age of youngest child for work-seeking requirements. Underpinned by 
sanctions for both groups, this has meant an attendant shift in conceptions of desert, while the 
boundaries in play have generated scope for challenge in relation to the treatment of mental ill-health 
and the carer/worker divide. Evidence of improved employment outcomes remains weak (Work and 
Pensions Committee, 2015; Kennedy et al, 2016a) 
Contestable margins 
Drawing on Munch, Lockwood and Douglas, we see that within the institutional battlefield the 
principles of stratified conditionality are pre-set by the epistemological assumptions underpinning 
welfare policy, and challenge has been at the margins of boundary drawing within this constraint – 
inconsistent and unreliable decision-making, the ambiguity of ‘make work pay’, and questionable 
distinctions between fit/unfit, carer/worker, and adult/child. Institutional scrutiny has addressed these 
aspects of ideological over-reach, ostensibly based on enforcement to work but placing inappropriate 
pressure on those with mental ill-health, while also drawing the unfit, carers, and children into their 
ambit. Though most contestation has been procedural in form, as with official reviews of the sanctions 
regime, more far reaching challenge occurs when internationally grounded guarantees can be 
engaged. Discrimination in relation to mental health or the well-being of children are key examples, 
where the Equality Act and/or the ECHR have had most purchase. A questioning of the construal of 
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dependency in relation to ‘make work pay’ stands as an exception in addressing justificatory 
principles, but has had only limited purchase, while the more general problems of declining living 
standards, the collapse of minimum guarantees, punitive destitution, and the compulsion to take 
insecure work in a ‘flexible’ labour market go largely uncorrected. The denigrating implications of 
policy for the moral standing of claimants on occasion come to light, but without a broader 
epistemological battle about the meaning and content of a moral vision for welfare, the edifice 
remains largely intact.  
Civic stratification and migration – thresholds, limits and exclusions 
The logic documented above extends to the management of migration, and the trans-national 
extension of opportunity that features in Munch’s model is tightly delimited in the British case. Again, 
we see stratified rights deployed as a means of social control, a supporting rationale citing behaviours 
and abuse, and shrinking boundaries of entitlement justified by ‘fairness’ to the taxpayer (Cameron, 
2013, 2014). Outside of permanent settlement, conditions of category for non-EEA migrants (outlined 
in Shutes, 2016) have long specified ‘no access to public funds’, normally precluding access for five 
years (Kennedy, 2015). However, migrant stratification starts before this, through distinctions of both 
category and circumstance (see Shutes, 2016) intended to forestall recourse to benefits in a filtering 
system on entry, in which familiar key principles apply.  
Thresholds of inclusion and exclusion 
In April 2011 annual limits were imposed on certain visa categories, and new maximum lengths of 
stay introduced for some workers. Other changes include closure of the low skilled visa category, and 
entry for job search by highly skilled migrants, but a faster route to permanency for individuals of 
high net worth (Gower, 2015). Skilled worker visas were restricted to graduate level at a salary 
threshold of £20,800, and a minimum salary of £35,000 was introduced for permanent settlement,20 
creating some boundary problems regarding shortage occupations,21 many nurses and teachers earning 
below this threshold. 
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Income thresholds are a form of conditionality by circumstance, limiting access for those who might 
become a charge on the state, and the 2012 immigration rules made this explicit in relation to a 
minimum income requirement (MIR) of £18.600 for non-EEA partner visas (with additions for 
children). The MIR reflects the amount required for maintenance ‘without becoming a burden on the 
taxpayer,’ and recognition of resources in addition to the applicants’ income was initially very 
narrow. Part of a broader objective to ‘bring a sense of fairness back to the immigration system’ (MM 
v SSHD [2013] EWHC 1900), the MIR echoes the rationale of welfare reform, and the probationary 
period excluding partners from public funds was extended in 2012 from two years to five. Despite this 
extension, the MIR set was one that 40-45 per cent of UK workers would fail (Gower, 2014:11), 
though the Migration Advisory Committee (MAC), in recommending possible thresholds, stated they 
were based on solely economic considerations and not ‘wider legal, social or moral issues’ (Gower, 
2014:4). Nonetheless, the Minister responsible stated: ‘family life must not be established in the UK 
at the taxpayer’s expense and family migrants must be able to integrate.’22 
Following Douglas, we find an underpinning epistemology that sees contribution and integration in 
financial terms, and stratifies access to the national territory and the right to family life23 by income, 
despite recognition of a disproportionate impact on members of low paid minorities, and on women 
(MM and Ors v SSHD [2013] para 113-4). These boundaries have been contested within the 
institutional battlefield, but government justification in terms of policy objectives was upheld by three 
judgments (from the High Court, Court of Appeal, and Supreme Court), none of which ruled that the 
MIR could be struck down, though the High Court noted a disproportionate impact on British citizens 
and refugees (MM and Ors v SSHD [2013] paras 13, 16). While all three courts recognised the 
possibility of recourse under ‘exceptional circumstances’, the UKSC (MM and Ors [2017] UKSC 10 
para 24) notes that this must amount to more than the accommodation of behavioural choice. The 
court did, however, see a case for considering the prospective earnings of an incoming spouse and 
verifiable third-party support (paras 95-8), while more crucially, the rules were deemed unlawful in 
failing to address the best interests of the child (para 92). This contravened S55 of the 2009 Borders 
Citizenship and Immigration Act, which ends a reservation on the CRC, and the rules have therefore 
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been revised24. They now allow consideration of other sources of income under a ten-year route to 
settlement when ‘exceptional circumstances’ are in play, raising further boundary questions. A 
concession outside the rules is available to prevent a conclusive breach of human rights, but is 
reportedly very rare indeed. 
The MIR thus stratifies access to family life for British citizens and settled non-EEA migrants on the 
basis of income, and justified by ‘fairness’. It raises boundary problems in relation to the 
consideration of additional resources, acknowledged discriminatory effects on minorities and women, 
and putative distinctions between citizens and refugees, and voluntary migrants. The contested rule 
eventually met a barrier in relation to domestic and international guarantees on the best interests of 
children, and as with the benefit cap, the government and courts again had to grapple with an aspect 
of civic stratification whereby a child may suffer due to the circumstances of the parent.  
Migrants and welfare rights 
Migrant access to benefits has been more directly stratified through a pledge to address ‘the magnetic 
pull of Britain’s benefits system’ on migration,25 for which MAC (2014) argue there is little evidence. 
Since non-EEA migrants do not have access to benefits until achieving permanent residence, attention 
turned to EEA migrants, and here we find stratified entitlement based on behavioural assumptions of 
abuse, designed to make Britain ‘a less attractive place for EU migrants who want to come here and 
try to live off the state’.26 Free Movement regulations under EU law grant 3 months automatic 
residence, and equal treatment for workers with respect to Social Security (Directive 2004/38/EC), 
though Brexit will mean longer term changes. Meanwhile, Britain has stretched to the maximum 
permitted constraints on EEA workers benefit rights.  
Stratifying measures from 2014 onwards (Kennedy, 2015) include a strengthening of the Habitual 
Residence Test to require 3 months residence for eligibility for JSA, and a variety of further 
constraints. A six-month time limit on JSA claims by new jobseekers was later reduced to 3 months, 
and they have been excluded from eligibility for HB, CB, and CTCs. EEA workers who become 
14 
 
unemployed are limited to six months JSA, and thereafter may lose worker status, which could also 
rebound on their path to permanent residence. A minimum earnings threshold now guides assessments 
of worker status, affecting potential access to other benefits and especially likely to penalise single 
parents (O’Brien, 2015). In March 2015 regulations were passed by Parliament to exclude EEA 
jobseekers from Universal Credit.  
The boundaries at issue are undermined by official sources that show EEA nationals do not 
disproportionately claim benefits (Keen and Turner, 2016), while the Social Security Advisory 
Committee notes the absence of evidence showing benefits as a reason for migration (Kennedy, 
2015a:26). Furthermore, the effect of migrant presence on jobs and wages is calculated to be 
extremely slight (Devlin et al, 2014). Nevertheless, British conditionality goes beyond that established 
under EU case law, (Case C-292/89 [1997] ECR I-00745) which requires evidence of continuing job-
search and a genuine chance of being engaged, in contrast to DWP guidance of ‘compelling evidence 
of a genuine prospect’ of work27. In contesting this requirement, CPAG28 have compiled arguments 
against the lawfulness of the test, and the Upper Tribunal (MB and Ors v SSWP [2016] UKUT, 372 
AAC para 57) has cautioned that ‘compelling evidence may…all too easily result in raising the bar 
above the level…found to be required’ for a real prospect within a reasonable period. So here we see 
institutional challenge at the margins without a full assault on the whittling away of jobseeker rights.  
The restrictions represent a step back from the ‘opening up of society to the outside’ (Munch, 2012), 
drawing boundaries that constrain any emergent post-national regime under EU law, and effecting a 
creeping withdrawal from minimum guarantees. We see stratifying moves towards a conception of 
social security as an individualised rather than mutual form of insurance, and an increasingly 
restrictive definition of worker status. The boundary drawing entailed amounts to an extreme instance 
of conditionality, bordering on exclusion, and eroding generalised reciprocity while taking labour.  
A further extension of civic stratification arises from an ECJ judgment (Zambrano v ONEm C-34/09) 
that created a right to work and reside for a non-EEA parent (a Zambrano carer), as required to give 
meaning to the status of minor age citizens of a member state in their state of nationality. This ruling 
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triggered the possibility of a benefit claim, but in November 2012 Zambrano carers were recognised 
in UK domestic law with the purpose of excluding them from income-based benefits. This boundary 
of exclusion was challenged but upheld in Sanneh and Ors v SSWP [2015] EWCA Civ 49 and HC v 
SSWP [2017] UKSC 73 by virtue of support available under S17 of the 1989 Children Act, provided 
at minimal levels by local authorities (LA’s), and described as a skeletal right for a group constructed 
as tolerated aliens (O’Brien, 2016). The DWP impact assessment29 cites a familiar rationale – fairness 
to the taxpayer, a reduced incentive to come and live off the state, and the allocation of public funds to 
those having the greatest connection with the UK. It is also argued the restriction will ensure that non-
EEA migrants wishing to have children must first secure sufficient funds (Sanneh, para 96), while 
further justification (para 97) states that the message is directed not just at Zambrano carers but a 
wider audience, and thus has a broader rhetorical function. 
The ruling not only affects the responsible parent (who may themselves be a taxpayer), but permits a 
lesser stratum of entitlement for some British children, who are held below mainstream subsistence 
levels. This boundary discriminates against Zambrano children in relation to other UK nationals, and 
though formally contested has been deemed justifiable in policy terms. 
Contestable Margins 
In sum, we again see stratified rights, boundary problems and formal contestation, but a holding back 
from challenge to underpinning assumptions. In the MIR case, the institutional battle is played out in 
the arena of the courts, but with only marginal success, and outside of limiting factors the UKSC 
endorses a cost-benefit approach to family life. It allows a limited conception of welfare that draws 
stratified lines of exclusion against overseas partners of both British citizens and non-EEA residents, 
justified by conceptions of fairness and responsibility. The UKSC judgment raises few questions as to 
whose interests immigration policy should serve, and contrasts with the family unification rights of 
those exercising free movement under EU law, to which the MIR does not apply. The restrictions on 
EEA benefit claims represent a further elaboration of conditionality that runs against the spirit of EU 
law, and represent an excessive form of individualisation that could bode ill for future domestic 
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welfare provision, while also undermining equal treatment guarantees - soon to be disbanded under 
Brexit. The Zambrano ruling echoes issues familiar from challenges to the benefit cap, though 
children are not placed at the centre of the case as benefits are paid on their behalf to their carers. In 
this respect, the boundary in play does not accord children themselves equal treatment, and again 
punishes a child for the circumstances of their parent(s). While each of these examples prompted 
recourse to international standards in the scrutiny of state actions, as highlighted in Munch’s model, 
institutional challenge has had only marginal success, repeatedly meeting the force of national 
constraint over access to public funds and sovereign control. 
Stratifying asylum – desert, deterrence and destitution 
Asylum seekers are a group seemingly outside of conditionality, exercising an absolute right to seek 
asylum and not required (or permitted) to work before at best a 12 month wait. However, they are 
more than ever subject to stratified boundaries, resource constraint, and contested exclusions aimed at 
behavioural change, as Britain meets the refugee crisis in Europe with a strategy of isolationism, 
resettlement as opposed to spontaneous arrival (May, 2015), and safe return reviews for recognised 
refugees30.  
Good and bad asylum seekers 
Public reaction to the death of Alan Kurdi31 prompted an expansion of the Syrian Vulnerable Persons 
Resettlement scheme and an additional commitment to resettle 3000 children and families from the 
region, initially under Humanitarian Protection but from March 2017 with full recognition on arrival. 
A reluctant amendment to the 2016 Immigration Act also committed the government to take an 
unspecified number of unaccompanied minors from within Europe - currently limited to 480,32 and 
dogged by fears of a ‘pull factor’ (McGuiness, 2017:16).  A small number of minors were also 
resettled under accelerated Dublin principles, but the scheme has now closed.33  
A stratified distinction has emerged between those selected for resettlement and those claiming 
asylum on arrival ‘after abusing the system’ (May, 2015), whereby the latter ‘false’ claims are argued 
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to deprive those in genuine need. The supporting rationale rests on a discourse of abuse, and 
boundaries of desert are drawn between the vulnerable targets of resettlement (amenable to control), 
and ‘the wealthiest, luckiest and strongest’ who make spontaneous (uncontrolled) claims.34 A 
distinction of worth is thus established by mode of arrival, and here is an epistemology that in 
Douglas’s terms creates its own reality. Visa regimes and carrier sanctions make arrival by legal 
means all but impossible, rendering most asylum seekers ‘abusers’, in a distinction undermined by 
poor decision making and success on appeal (All Party Parliamentary Group (APPG), 2017:8). 
Boundary drawing by mode of arrival filters through to a stratified reception system, subject to critical 
comment from the APPG who report that resettled refugees are better supported in accessing 
mainstream benefits and the labour market, while ‘spontaneous’ arrivals suffer a deficit.   
Asylum support system 
Stratified standards of maintenance have provoked a further boundary issue, manifest in judicial 
deliberation over levels of support for asylum seekers (Refugee Action v SSHD [2014] EWHC 1033).  
In 1999 the asylum support rate was set at 70% of Income Support (IS), and increased in line with this 
until 2008 when the link was broken (para 17). As of 2011, the rate was frozen at 51 per cent of IS for 
single adults but 81 per cent for children, and in 2014 was subject to legal challenge by Refugee 
Action, presenting evidence that 40 per cent could not afford enough food and 88 per cent had no 
money for clothes. The Home Office (HO) defended the need to demonstrate ‘fairness’ to the 
taxpayer (para 26), and claimed erroneously that rates had risen 11.5 per cent over the preceding five 
years. Identifying this error, the judge ruled there had been a failure to gather sufficient information 
for a rational judgement. However, the HO recalculation justified the existing rate, defended by the 
view that an increase could encourage spurious asylum claims, clogging up the system and impeding 
support for those with a genuine fear of persecution.35 
The previous year a Parliamentary enquiry36 addressed the same boundary issues, expressing concern 
that rates were too low and should not fall below 70 per cent of IS, while the Refugee Action 
judgment stated that a reduction from what was regarded as a minimum requires careful investigation 
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(para 149). The enquiry also noted the lack of evidence that a higher rate would attract greater 
numbers and found the assumption that deteriorating conditions would make people leave to be 
dangerously flawed. It noted that current levels of support for children did not meet their essential 
living needs, and indeed higher rates had earlier been endorsed by the HO as protecting the best 
interests of the child (Refugee Action v SSHD, para 27). However, adjustments in 2015 further 
reduced support by standardising weekly rates at £36.95 per person, thus removing preferential rates 
for children and single parents37. A follow-up challenge (Ghulam and Ors v SSHD [2016] EWHC 
2639) failed, with no permission to appeal.  
As with the benefit cap there were boundary concerns about eroding children’s entitlement on the 
basis of parental status, and a possible breach of child welfare guarantees under S55 of 2009 Act. 
However, the judge (paras 241-2) held that what was required was merely the provision of a minimum 
dignified standard of living, and that a difference between asylum support and IS rates was justified 
by the legitimate purpose of discouraging economic migration and protecting limited resources 
against spending in excess of obligations.  
Failed asylum seekers and undocumented migrants 
Measures in the 2016 Immigration Act designed to further stratify support for failed asylum seekers 
also reveal behavioural assumptions concerning their motivations, a rationale of deterrence, and 
contested boundary drawing. In the pre-existing system, S94(5) of the 1999 Asylum and Immigration 
Act allowed failed asylum seekers with children to continue in receipt of support. This is now to be 
curtailed, while provision for childless failed asylum seekers and other categories of migrant under S4 
of the 1999 Act has been repealed. The justification is that failed asylum seekers are illegal migrants 
and should no longer receive preferential treatment, which ‘sends entirely the wrong message’ and 
‘undermines public confidence’ (Home Office, 2015:3). A government factsheet on the measures38 
states that ‘people who do not need our help and who refuse to return home are here illegally’, while 
those who can and should leave cannot expect to be supported by the taxpayer in making themselves 
‘intentionally destitute’ by refusal to depart. There is particular emphasis (Home Office, 2015) that 
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S55 of the 2009 Act and local authority (LA) obligations do not require support where a family 
decides to remain unlawfully, so destitution emerges as the lowest rung on the civic stratification 
ladder. 
However, the scope of S95 support for asylum seekers is to be expanded where there are further 
submissions on protection grounds or a Judicial Review (JR) outstanding (Gower et al, 2015, S6), and 
a new S95A will support failed asylum seekers who are destitute and can show a genuine obstacle to 
leaving. This requirement is difficult to meet, and the onus of proof has shifted from the HO to the 
claimant, with no right of appeal (Home Office, 2015). Charges that the outcome could be destitution 
and the creation of a new client group for local authority (LA) support (Harvey and Harper, 2017) led 
to a late amendment diverting recourse to S17 through a scheme governed by HO regulations under 
10A schedule 3 of the 2002 Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act. Incorporating conditionality by 
conduct, this applies to families not eligible for S95A but who are co-operating with departure, or 
have an ongoing non-asylum application or appeal, or where necessary for the welfare of a child. It 
also encompasses migrant families excluded from mainstream support (eg. Zambrano carers), while 
10B caters for ‘adult’ migrant care leavers with an outstanding non-asylum application or appeal, or 
appeal rights exhausted but judged to require support. Other care leavers without status are also 
denied the LA route to care leaving provision, which is intended for those ‘with a long-term future in 
the UK’ (Home Office, 2016).  
These stratifying measures attempt to draw a clearer line between asylum seekers and failed asylum 
seekers, while blurring the boundary between the latter and those unlawfully present, and seeking to 
delimit the scope for their support. HO consultation on these measures has been the principle site of 
institutional contestation, and one response queried whether it would be acceptable to the HO for 
refused asylum families to be left destitute and visibly homeless on the streets39, arguing that central 
and local government cannot simply be absolved of their duty of care to vulnerable children. LA’s 
remain obliged under S17 to assess any child in their area who may be in need, and in recognition of 
this LA support has been allowed while eligibility for HO support is determined. In fact, the final 
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version of the legislation leaves LA human rights duties intact as a residual safeguard (Harvey and 
Harper, 2017:383) 
The consultation process generated further criticism, with the Children’s Commissioner40 arguing the 
changes rely on behavioural assumptions that the government’s own Impact Assessment recognises 
are hard to evidence, putting children at risk in spurious expectation of change from their parents. 
This is held to conflict with both the CRC and S55 of 2009 Act, while several organisations note that 
the HO pilot of a similar measure failed to show that cutting support would increase departures41. The 
lack of appeal is contentious, since refusals involve boundary judgements not just about destitution 
but fitness to travel, taking reasonable steps to leave, and barriers to leaving – viewed as 
‘straightforward matters of fact’ by the HO42.  
Restrictions on care leaving raise a boundary problem over stratified support for minors, and when 
state responsibility should come to an end, provoking argument that it undermines protections in the 
Children Act for children leaving care and could contravene the CRC. This is seen as inconsistent 
with the aim that care leavers should enter life with same life chances as others43. The HO position, 
however, is that care leaver support is not an appropriate vehicle for maintenance pending the 
departure of ‘adult migrants’ with no lawful basis to remain (Home Office, 2016). An amendment at 
third reading made an exception to cover victims of trafficking44, but the overall outcome is a 
stratified system of care leaving aimed at correcting perceptions that Britain provides generous long-
term support for all who arrive as children (Home Office, 2016).  
Contestable margins 
Asylum policy is characterised by a system of isolationism and exclusion that distinguishes between 
resettled and spontaneous arrivals, who then experience a two-tier system of reception. For the latter 
group, a stratified and shrinking system of support reveals a behavioural orientation with the stated 
aims of discouraging arrivals, promoting a culture of compliance, encouraging voluntary return, and 
correcting perceptions that are assumed to attract minor age asylum seekers to Britain. In line with 
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Munch’s comments on responsible statehood, formal contestation has drawn upon a range of 
international instruments (eg. the CRC, the ECHR, the Charter of Fundamental Rights) as well as 
domestic law giving expression to international standards45, but to little practical effect. In fact, 
beyond recognition of an objective minimum standard, legal judgments stress that it is not for the 
courts to determine the level of asylum support (Ghulam, paras 36-7; Refugee Action, para 3). 
Boundary problems have turned on the appropriate relationship between minimum standards endorsed 
in domestic welfare and those required to ensure dignified standards for asylum seekers. A similar 
exercise has weighed the degree of support required for unaccompanied minors who enter adulthood 
with appeal rights exhausted against domestic guarantees for minors leaving care. While institutional 
contestation has produced some modification at the margins, unsubstantiated assumptions of abuse 
pervade all measures and immigration control has assumed priority over relief from destitution and 
the protection of children. 
Conclusion - The emergent welfare paradigm 
The conditional and disciplinary drive pervading welfare provision in austerity Britain is not of course 
new but since the change of government in 2010 has been sufficiently extended to amount to what 
Munch would term an emergent paradigm. He applies this notion when a consistent vocabulary of 
ideas, concepts and remedies spills over from one policy area to another, reconfiguring core principles 
of welfare and inclusion in the process. In the British case, an attack on the ‘something for nothing 
culture’, driven by a unifying rhetoric of ‘fairness’, and set against assumptions of abuse, extends 
from domestic welfare to migration and asylum, to fashion a contraction of social rights across all 
three fields. Analysis of the related policy measures has here adopted a civic stratification approach, 
paying particular attention to the boundary drawing entailed in this increasingly restrictive dynamic, 
and informed by Munch’s attention to justificatory rhetoric, and Douglas’s reflections on how 
institutions think. The argument is further advanced by Munch’s battlefield approach, which focuses 
on the likelihood of struggle around attempts to reconfigure basic tenets of welfare policy. Bringing 
together these theoretical insights, this article has traced the stratifying devices in play for each field, 
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the justificatory rhetoric supporting their deployment, its underpinning assumptions, and the boundary 
problems and contestable margins that emerge within the ‘institutional battlefield’.  
Viewing domestic entitlement, migration and asylum within the same frame, we can highlight the 
strategies and rationale apparent across all three fields. Each of the measures discussed deploys civic 
stratification to structure entitlement by shrinking categories of desert and increased conditionality, 
justified by notions of dependency as a behavioural choice, and carrying associated charges of abuse - 
variously amenable to discipline, deterrence, or exclusion. In the terms of Munch’s model (Munch, 
2012:6), we find a welfare approach based on individual achievement and responsibility, and a 
rhetorical shift in solidarity that prioritises protection of the hardworking taxpayer while eroding 
minimum guarantees. But beyond this picture, as Munch’s model foresees, key changes have been 
subject to institutional contestation via parliamentary review, policy consultation, and judicial 
scrutiny, drawing on conceptions of responsible statehood and international human rights. Each of the 
measures discussed rests on problematic boundary drawing that has in most cases led to formal 
questioning and challenge within the institutional battlefield, but despite some notable successes this 
has yielded only marginal adjustment. 
However, a focus on the institutional battlefield has also meant that in viewing the three fields 
together, we are able to identify not only common strategies and rhetoric, but recurrent boundary 
problems and points of challenge. Against almost every measure there are charges of inadequate 
evidence, inconsistent and/or poor decision making, the creation of destitution in the name of control, 
discriminatory effects on vulnerable groups, and/or negative impacts on children. Charges of 
discrimination, and a failure to prioritise the welfare of children have had the most purchase in 
contesting problematic boundary drawing and challenging its impact at the margins, in part because 
related protections are underpinned by international guarantees. Given these protections and other 
institutional sources of contestation, the supporting rationale is never quite securely established. 
However, much of the institutional battle has been fought on procedural issues that amend aspects of 
design and implementation, but leave the broader rationale and objectives largely intact. Indeed, a 
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number of legal judgments exercise restraint in ruling on more fundamental challenges to government 
policy, and rational aims linked to legitimate objectives provide an official last line of defence. A 
more fundamental assault on the problems documented here must therefore move beyond the confines 
of the institutional battlefield and look to the rhetorical battlefield in which the justificatory rationale 
is generated and sustained. 
Notes 
                                                          
1
 Combining six working age benefits (DWP, 2010) 
 
2
 Here meaning means-tested working age benefits 
 
3
 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/jobseekers-allowance-overview-of-sanctions-rules  
4
 Now the Youth Obligation Scheme and the Work and Health Programme. 
5http://www.cpag.org.uk/sites/default/files/Broken%20promises%20FINAL%20for%20website.pdf  
6
 Restricted availability is permitted for lone parents, carers and ill health. 
 
7
 https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmworpen/585/585.pdf  
8










 Revised under the Coalition but subject to controversy 
12
 http://www.cpag.org.uk/content/esa-and-sanctions-%E2%80%93-more-hard-times-ahead  
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 £26,000 in 2012, lowered in 2016 to £23,000 for London and £20,00 elsewhere 
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 A contested claim. See: https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/may/09/iain-duncan-smith-
benefits-cap-statistics  
18
 https://z2k.org/2017/05/88000-households-hit-by-lower-benefit-cap/  
19
 Engaging article 1 protocol 1, and article 8 
20
 With exceptions for PhD level jobs, and shortage occupations 
21
 http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-7264  
22
 https://www.freemovement.org.uk/outcome-of-mm-minimum-income-case-in-court-of-appeal/  
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 https://www.pressreader.com/uk/the-guardian/20171024/281827169011133  
 
33
 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/08/dubs-scheme-lone-child-refugees-uk-closed-down  
34
 For 2012-16 the latter outnumbered the former by 5:1 (APPG, 2017) 
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companiedYoungPeople_HoCCS_Nov15_FINAL.pdf   
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 http://www.nrpfnetwork.org.uk/News/Pages/local-authority-support-update.aspx  
45
 S55 of 2009, and the PSED  
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